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FROM STEREOTYPES TO SOLID 
GROUND: REFRAMING THE EQUAL  
PROTECTION INTERMEDIATE 
SCRUTINY STANDARD AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO GENDER-BASED 
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS POLICIES 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to an increasingly female student population on 
campuses across the country, many undergraduate admissions 
committees at both public and private institutions now give 
preference to male applicants.1 Despite the apparent conflict between 
such policies and the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,2 
few have generated full-blown legal challenges.3 Aside from the 
difficulties associated with proving gender-based discrimination, 
perhaps one reason for the absence of equal-protection claims is the 
somewhat murky state of the law on gender-based discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
1 See generally, Charlotte Allen, The Quiet Preference for Men in Admissions, MINDING 
THE CAMPUS, (June 7, 2010), http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2010/06/the_quiet_ 
preference_for_men.html; Jennifer Delahunty Britz, Op-Ed., To All the Girls I’ve Rejected, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006; Daniel DeVise, Sex Bias Probe in Colleges’ Selections, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 14, 2009, at B1; Alex Kingsbury, Admittedly Unequal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
June 25, 2007, at 50.  
2 Since 1971, the United States Supreme Court has held gender-based discrimination to a 
heightened standard of review under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (finding Idaho’s objective in administrative convenience 
insufficient to justify gender discrimination). Since that turning point, the Court has not upheld 
the constitutionality of any law that facially discriminates against women.  
3 Tellingly, the plaintiffs in the one challenge to reach the federal court system thus far 
brought the claim only under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (reviewing plaintiffs’ claims 
that the University of Georgia’s gender and racial preferences in admissions violated Title’s VI 
and IX of the Civil Rights Act), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). The Johnson court found 
Georgia’s gender preference policy unconstitutional, and noted that the “desire to help out 
men . . . is far from persuasive.” Id. at 1376 n.10 (quotations omitted).  
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under the Equal Protection Clause. While it is generally accepted that 
gender-based classifications must be evaluated under intermediate 
scrutiny, the Supreme Court’s precedent provides lower courts with 
little guidance in applying that standard.4 
Part of the reason for this confusion lies in the dominant role the 
concept of “stereotype” plays in the Court’s intermediate scrutiny 
analysis. As this Comment illustrates, the Court has articulated its 
intermediate scrutiny standard in a way that makes “stereotype,” a 
concept that remains ill-defined in the Court’s jurisprudence, the 
deciding factor in its analysis.5 While the Court has succeeded in 
articulating a relatively manageable intermediate scrutiny test in the 
First Amendment context for commercial speech,6 its focus on 
stereotype has impeded its ability to do the same in the context of 
equal protection. This leaves lower courts and litigants seeking to 
defend or challenge gender-based classifications with little guidance 
on how to address questions that often prove critical in the equal-
protection intermediate scrutiny analysis. 
This Comment demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s equal-
protection jurisprudence is in fact less muddled than it initially 
appears. Rather, the Court’s equal-protection intermediate scrutiny 
decisions reflect a reasoned application of the very same principles 
the Court articulates in the First Amendment intermediate scrutiny 
context, where the judicial discourse has not been dominated by the 
unmanageable concept of gender group “stereotypes.” Thus, 
reframing the equal-protection intermediate scrutiny analysis in a way 
that corresponds to its First Amendment counterpart would be entirely 
consistent with the Court’s prior precedent. Moreover, an 
understanding of the parallels between the two analyses explains 
away some of the perceived inconsistencies in the Court’s equal-
protection jurisprudence. 
Part I briefly discusses the evolution and operation of gender-
based admissions policies in higher education. Part II illustrates the 
development of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, including 
                                                                                                                 
4 See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center American Civil Liberties 
Union, et al., in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
(No. 94-1941), 1995 WL 703392 at *6–7 (“There is serious confusion among the lower courts 
regarding the application of intermediate scrutiny to governmental classifications based on 
sex.”). 
5 See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449–50 (2000) 
(discussing how stereotype factors into the Court’s analysis).  
6 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980) (discussing the standard by which courts should review commercial speech regulations). 
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the “anti-stereotyping principle” that dominates the Court’s 
intermediate scrutiny analysis, and the problems associated with such 
reliance on “stereotypes” in judicial decision making. Part III 
demonstrates how the Court’s focus on stereotypes has prevented it 
from fully articulating the analysis it has employed in cases 
addressing gender discrimination, and why the Court often seems to 
contradict itself from one case to the next. Parts IV illustrates the 
parallels between the Court’s First Amendment and equal-protection 
intermediate scrutiny analyses, and demonstrate how viewing equal-
protection intermediate scrutiny through the lens of First Amendment 
intermediate scrutiny explains many of the points of confusion and 
perceived inconsistencies in the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence. Part V discusses how courts and litigants addressing a 
challenge to a gender-based admissions policies can use the Central 
Hudson factors to frame their arguments and conduct their analysis in 
a way that both clarifies the law and ensures that the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection does not play second fiddle to changing 
societal perceptions. 
I. GENDER-BASED ADMISSIONS POLICIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Over the past four decades, women’s enrollment in higher 
education has increased at rapid-fire rates. In 1980, approximately 
50% of college students were female.7 That percentage rose to 57% 
by 2006, and is expected to continue rising past 60%.8 This increase 
reflects social trends that have been building for some time. 
According to observers of the educational system: young women are 
outperforming their male counterparts in terms of academic 
achievement.9 At first glance, this increase in women’s academic 
achievement and resulting increase in female admissions rates would 
be cause for celebration. But many university administrators fear that 
an increasingly high percentage of female students will negatively 
impact the ability of a university to attract applicants, which in turn 
                                                                                                                 
7 Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 50, 51. 
8 Id. 
9 See generally Michelle Conlin, The NEW Gender Gap: From Kindergarten to Grad 
School, Boys Are Becoming the Second Sex, BUS. WK., May 26, 2003, at 75 (discussing the 
differing achievement levels of men and women); Michael Gurian, Disappearing Act: Where 
Have the Men Gone? No Place Good, The WASH. POST, December 4, 2005, at B1 (discussing 
the trouble colleges have attracting and educating men); Tamar Lewin, At Colleges, Women Are 
Leaving Men in the Dust, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at A1 (“[M]en . . . are less likely than 
women to get bachelor’s degrees – and among those who do, fewer complete their degrees in 
four or five years.”).  
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will negatively affect a university’s prestige.10 The rationale for this 
belief is two-fold. On one hand, university admissions directors fear 
that males who perceive schools with a predominantly female 
population as “girls’ schools,” will be deterred from applying.11 
Conversely, school administrators fear that female applicants will be 
deterred by the lack of opportunities to interact with members of the 
opposite sex.12 
Additionally, observers believe that the problems associated with 
an increasingly “female” student body go beyond a decline in prestige 
and university ranking. As editorialist Richard Whitmire observed 
when interviewing students at James Madison University—a school 
with 61% female population—gender imbalance can facilitate what 
has been described as a “hookup culture” on campus.13 College 
students report that in an environment where males are in the 
minority, women compete to attract male attention, while males take 
advantage of their “in demand” status, and in some cases even 
become sexual predators.14 Thus, many university admissions officers 
across the country must decide between continuing to admit only the 
most qualified applicants, and risk the dangers associated with an 
unbalanced student body, or taking affirmative steps to ensure that an 
equal number of males and females are admitted.  
At University of North Carolina’s Chapel Hill campus, for 
instance, trustees became alarmed upon learning that the school’s 
incoming freshman class was comprised of 58% women, and 
suggested that the university create an “affirmative action” policy for 
male applicants.15 The Board of Trustees at the University of 
Richmond instructed the admissions office to keep the male-female 
ratio at or below 45/55, according to a senior associate director of 
                                                                                                                 
10 See Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing the desire of university administrators to 
admit roughly equal numbers of men and women); see also Britz, supra note 1, at A25 (noting 
that the unfortunate consequence of admitting more women is a drop in the total number of 
applicants). 
11 See Britz, supra note 1 (noting that fewer males find a campus that has more than 60% 
women attractive). 
12 See Ernest Holsendolph, Grappling with the Gender Disparity Issue, DIVERSE: ISSUES 
HIGHER EDUC., June 1, 2006, at 12 (“[S]tudents may prefer to attend schools where they’ll have 
more opportunities to interact with the opposite sex.”); Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 52 (noting a 
discussion with a sophomore female at the College of William and Mary in which the student 
joked about the shortage of men to take to dances). 
13 Richard Whitmire, A Tough Time to Be a Girl: Gender Imbalance on College 
Campuses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 25, 2008, at A23.  
14 See id. (discussing how males take advantage of the competition and sometimes the 
result is abuse). 
15 Allen, supra note 1.  
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admissions at that school.16 The University of Georgia went one step 
further, implementing an affirmative action policy that awarded 
additional points to male applicants.17 Regardless of the specific 
methods utilized by schools instituting these policies, the results have 
become clear: universities are denying admission to female applicants 
in favor of less qualified males.18  
In 2009, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights launched an 
investigation of 19 public and private institutions of higher education 
across the country.19 The investigation aimed to determine the extent 
to which the named colleges and universities preferred male 
applicants in their admissions processes.20 As the Commission can 
only make referrals and recommendations based on its findings, no 
legal consequences will flow directly from the Commission’s 
investigation.21 Nevertheless, a very real possibility exists that public 
universities found to discriminate on the basis of gender in their 
admissions policies will face potential lawsuits under the Equal 
Protection Clause.22 
II. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AND THE  
ANTISTEREOTYPING PRINCIPLE 
In cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court applies different levels of 
judicial scrutiny depending on the nature of the classification at 
issue.23 For a number of years, the Court only applied two levels of 
scrutiny: strict scrutiny and rational basis review. Under strict 
                                                                                                                 
16 See Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 50 (discussing the University of Richmond’s 
admissions policy). 
17 See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 
(S.D. Ga. 2000) (noting that the University of Georgia provided males .25 of the requisite 4.92 
“total student index” points to gain admission), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 
18 See Britz, supra note 1, for the Dean of Admissions at Kenyon College’s discussion of 
this unfortunate truth. 
19 See Allen, supra note 1 (noting that the U.S. Civil Rights Commission launched an 
investigation “into the extent of male preferences in admissions decisions at 19 various 
institutions of higher learning”); DeVise, supra note 1, at B1 (discussing the Civil Rights 
commission’s probe).  
20 See Allen, supra note 1 (discussing the investigation). 
21 See DeVise, supra note 1, at B2 (noting that the commission has no authority to enforce 
complaints but can refer them to other agencies or recommend changes to federal law). 
22 While gender discrimination may also give rise to legal proceedings under Title IX of 
the Civil Rights Act and state antidiscrimination statutes, a discussion of those remedies falls 
outside the scope of this Comment. 
23 See Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States 
v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1172–73 
(1998) (discussing the differing levels of scrutiny for equal protection challenges). 
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scrutiny, which the Court traditionally applied to classifications based 
on race, the classification must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a 
“compelling governmental interest.”24 The Court applies rational-
basis review to all other classifications, requiring only a rational 
relationship between the classification and a legitimate government 
interest.25 
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court had never struck down instances 
of discrimination on the basis of gender.26 As the movement for 
women’s rights gained speed, however, the Court began to recognize 
gender as a protected class. For several years, the Court equivocated 
over the proper level of scrutiny to apply in gender-discrimination 
cases. In Reed v. Reed,27 the Court’s first decision striking down a 
gender-based classification, the Court applied rational-basis review to 
strike down a state statute granting preference to males as estate 
executors.28 Several years later, the Court took the opposite approach 
in Frontiero v. Richardson,29 striking down a gender-based policy 
under strict scrutiny.30 
Finally, in Craig v. Boren,31 the Court announced a new, 
intermediate scrutiny standard.32 The Court reasoned that intermediate 
scrutiny is more appropriate than strict scrutiny for gender-based 
classifications because differences between men and women may in 
some circumstances justify different treatment.33 Unlike strict 
scrutiny, which recognizes that there are almost never “inherent 
differences” between different races to justify differential treatment,34 
                                                                                                                 
24 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 508 (2005); see also Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that courts must subject racially discriminatory laws to the 
“most rigid scrutiny”). 
25 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting 
that the “general rule” is that legislation must be “rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest”). 
26 See Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1172 (noting that until 1971 gender based classification 
were reviewed under a rational basis).  
27  404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
28 Id. at 76. 
29  411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
30 Id. at 689–90. 
31 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
32 See id. at 197 (holding that “previous cases establish that classification by gender must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives”).  
33 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (discussing the 
allowable bases for gender classifications). 
34  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted) (“It follows from that principle that all governmental action based on 
race—a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore 
prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to 
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the more lenient intermediate scrutiny standard leaves room for states 
to classify individuals based on gender when legitimate differences 
between the genders make it necessary to do so.35 Intended to serve as 
a middle ground between strict scrutiny and rational basis, 
intermediate scrutiny requires that government demonstrate that a 
gender classification serves important government interests, and that 
the classification is substantially related to the achievement of those 
interests.36 In its more recent jurisprudence, the Court announced that 
to survive this degree of scrutiny, proponents of a gender 
classification must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive” 
justification for a policy that discriminates on the basis of gender.37 
A. Stereotype in Intermediate Scrutiny 
While the Court repeatedly recited the test for intermediate 
scrutiny as including an interest and tailoring component, these 
articulated components of intermediate scrutiny are rarely the 
deciding factors in a Supreme Court gender discrimination decision.38 
Rather, the Court’s inquiry focuses almost exclusively on whether the 
policy at issue reinforces a stereotype, or an overbroad generalization 
about men and women.39 Although not all of the Court’s decisions use 
the term “stereotype,” the word is a term of art among commentators, 
referring to any number of overbroad, archaic, or irrational 
generalizations the Court finds insufficient to justify gender-based 
classifications.40 
For instance, in analyzing whether a governmental interest is 
sufficiently “important” to justify a gender classification, the Court 
rejects as “illegitimate” any interest that reflects “archaic and 
                                                                                                                 
 
equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
35 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to 
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” 
(quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))). 
36 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
37 Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
38 See Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (noting that the interest and tailoring prongs of 
intermediate scrutiny “have rarely been the moving parts” in the Court’s analysis of gender 
discrimination claims). 
39 See id. (noting that if a governmental action distinguishes between men and women the 
only remaining question is “[d]oes the sex-respecting rule rely on a stereotype?”).  
40 See, e.g., id. (noting that “‘stereotype’ has become a term of art”); see also infra Part 
II.B (discussing the Court’s various articulations of this concept). 
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stereotypic notions” about members of a gender group.41 The Court 
also uses the concept of stereotype in analyzing whether a gender-
classification is substantially tailored to achieve that interest. The 
Court has expressly noted that the purpose of the “substantial 
relationship” requirement “is to assure that the validity of a 
classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than 
through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, 
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”42  
When framed in this manner, the tailoring prong of intermediate 
scrutiny turns on the concept of stereotype just as much as the 
substantial-interest prong. In this respect, the Court’s intermediate 
scrutiny jurisprudence embodies what commentators have called the 
“anti-stereotyping principle.”43 This focus on stereotype differentiates 
intermediate scrutiny from the other levels of judicial scrutiny that 
center more heavily on the nature of the interest to be served, and the 
connection between that interest and the means selected to achieve it. 
While this lack of jurisprudential cohesion may not in and of itself 
pose a problem, the Court’s reliance on “stereotype” presents 
difficulties for lower courts because the Court has failed to fully 
articulate exactly what “stereotype” means. Moreover, the Court has 
failed to account for the possibility that stereotypes vary from one 
generation to the next, such that ideas about men and women that are 
readily accepted as true today could become tomorrow’s “archaic” 
and “outmoded” generalizations. 
B. Stereotype Is Ill-defined and Creates Difficulty for Lower Courts 
Perhaps the most obvious problem inherent in the Court’s reliance 
on stereotypes to evaluate gender-based classifications lies in its 
failure to clearly define a term that plays such an important role in its 
analysis. In many of its early gender discrimination cases, the Court 
indicated that stereotypes are those generalizations that are 
“outmoded” or “archaic.”44 The Court also made clear that 
                                                                                                                 
41 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (noting that the 
“statutory objective” cannot reflect “archaic and stereotypic notions” (citing Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (plurality opinion))).  
42 Id. at 725–26. 
43 See generally Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 88 (2010) (discussing the anti-stereotyping 
principle). 
44 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (holding that a statute that provided 
that females reach age of majority at 18 and that males reach age of majority at 21 could not 
survive equal-protection analysis because it merely relied on “old notions” regarding the sexes); 
see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (framing “stereotypes” as 
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“outmoded” ideas are those suggesting that the “proper place” of 
women is in the home and that women need “special protection.”45  
More recently, the Court characterized as “stereotypes” those 
assumptions that are unrelated to inherent differences between males 
and females.46 Similarly, the Court has framed “different physical 
needs of men and women” as the opposite of stereotype,47 indicating 
that any classification based on physical differences would not offend 
the equal protection clause under intermediate scrutiny. While this 
definition could offer an objective basis for distinguishing permissible 
from impermissible assumptions, the Court has never articulated the 
boundaries of the concept of “inherent” or “physical” differences. As 
Part IV illustrates, while the only “inherent” differences the Court has 
recognized are those related to reproduction; still, the Court has never 
expressly limited the concept to only reproductive differences. 
In United States v. Virginia,48 the Court used perhaps the broadest 
definition of stereotype when it referred to “overbroad generalizations 
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and 
females.”49 The Court then narrowed its definition in Tuan Anh 
Nguyen v. I.N.S.,50 defining stereotype as the “frame of mind resulting 
from irrational or uncritical analysis.”51 This provides the narrowest 
definition articulated thus far; in fact, under the Nguyen standard, 
virtually any classification that is “rational” would pass constitutional 
muster. Notably, however, the Court has not used this definition of 
stereotype since its decision in Nguyen, and has since returned to the 
broad definition articulated in Virginia.52  
                                                                                                                 
 
archaic and outdated misconceptions concerning role of women in home or work); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985) (referring to “outmoded 
notions” concerning women’s capabilities); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (noting 
that “‘old notions’ of role typing” were not valid governmental classifications). 
45 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1979) (striking down a statute providing 
alimony only to women because the state relied impermissibly on an assumption that women 
play a “dependent role” in the “allocation of family responsibilities”). Similarly, the Court in 
Craig v. Boren expressed concern for “outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females 
in the home rather than in the marketplace and world of ideas.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–99 
(quotation marks omitted). 
46 Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (referring to “assumptions 
about . . . men and women that are unrelated to any inherent differences between the sexes”); 
Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733 n.6 (2003) (discussing the “different 
physical needs of men and women”).  
47 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733 n.6 (2003). 
48  518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
49 Id. at 533. 
50  533 U.S. 53 (2000). 
51 Id. at 68. 
52 See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729 (“The State’s justification for such a classification 
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C. Stereotypes Change from Generation to Generation 
While the Court’s failure to define “stereotype” in a consistent 
manner creates obvious problems for litigants and lower courts 
seeking guidance, the more fundamental problem lies in the 
possibility that an important constitutional question, such as the 
permissibility of a gender-based policy, could turn on a transient 
concept that varies from one generation to the next. As Justice Scalia 
observed in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,53 “times and trends do 
change,”54 such that the constitutionality of a gender classification 
may depend solely on “the current generation’s conclusion that a 
politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the 
basis of [gender] is reasonable.”55 
A review of the Court’s decisions demonstrates how one era’s 
accepted truths may easily become another era’s “stereotype.” For 
instance, in an 1872 decision upholding a statute banning women 
from being admitted to the legal profession, three concurring justices 
relied heavily on the “wide difference in the respective spheres and 
destinies of man and woman.”56 These justices also noted that “[t]he 
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother.”57 In upholding a statute that 
prohibited women from working as bartenders, the Court accepted the 
government’s contention that it needed to protect women from the 
“moral dangers” associated with the liquor industry.58 But a mere 
three decades after its decision in Goesart, a plurality of the Court 
rejected these ideas as “romantic paternalism,” which “put women, 
not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”59 As these decisions demonstrate, 
the line between accepted truths and “stereotypes” about genders can 
shift dramatically over a short period time.  
                                                                                                                 
 
‘must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences 
of males and females.’” (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533)). 
53 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
54 Id. at 158 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
55 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
56  Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
57 Id. 
58 Goesart v. Cleary, 355 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (“Since bartending by women may, in the 
allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may 
devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it 
believes that as to a defined group of females other factors are operating which either eliminate 
or reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition.”). 
59 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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Additionally, the Justice Powell cautioned against “hitching the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to . . . transitory 
considerations.”60 While the “transitory considerations” Justice 
Powell spoke of in Bakke referred to the minority or majority position 
of various racial groups within society, the same principle applies to 
beliefs about the position of men and women in society. Like a 
particular racial group’s minority or majority status, the concept of a 
gender stereotype is subject to “shifting political and social 
judgments.”61 Because the Court has acknowledged many gender 
stereotypes reflect “archaic” ideas about the proper roles of men and 
women, it follows that present-day “stereotypes” were once well-
accepted truths that could be invoked to justify gender-based 
discrimination.62  
The Bakke Court cautioned that such “mutability of a 
constitutional principle” undermines the Court’s ability to “discern 
‘principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the 
community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift 
them above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a 
particular time and place.’”63 It remains a very real possibility that 
while some gender-based classifications, particularly those designed 
to compensate members of one gender group,64 may be permissible at 
one time, the same classifications could be rendered impermissible in 
the future, particularly once gender “preferences beg[i]n to have their 
desired effect.”65 This creates a problem for courts looking for 
                                                                                                                 
60 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
61 Id. at 299. 
62 Commentators have even suggested that individual judges’ “personal perceptions of the 
reasonableness of allocating rights by gender” have influenced the Court’s decisions. 4 RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE § 18.23(k) (4th ed. 2007); see also E.A. Hull, Sex Discrimination and the Equal 
Protection Clause: An Analysis of Kahn v. Shevin and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639, 
671 (1979) (“Unlike the lenient rational relationship, or the rigorous strict scrutiny test, the 
middle-tier has no predictable application. Whether or not a given classification furthers an 
‘important governmental interest,’ or is ‘substantially related’ to this interest, are subjective 
determinations, and a conservative majority is as likely to conclude one way as a liberal 
majority is to conclude the other.”); John K. Vincent, Note, Equal Protection and the “Middle-
Tier”: The Impact on Women and Illegitimates, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303, 321 (1978) 
(noting the highly subjective nature of the inquiry and “the confusion and inconsistency 
generated” by the intermediate scrutiny standard). 
63 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (quoting A. COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)). 
64 See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (analyzing a provision allowing 
women to deduct low-income years for purposes of calculating social security retirement 
benefits); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (analyzing a statute providing property tax 
exemption to women).  
65 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297. 
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guidance in the Supreme Court’s early intermediate scrutiny 
jurisprudence; while certain assumptions about women may have 
reflected a well-documented truth in 1971, they may today reinforce 
“archaic notions” about males and females. Similarly, ideas about 
males and females unheard of forty years ago (for instance, the idea 
that males are less likely to achieve academically than their female 
counterparts) may now turn the concept of “stereotype” on its head.66  
III. PERCEIVED “UNWORKABILITY”67 OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
In addition to the problems with relying on an ill-defined and ever-
changing concept to decide constitutional questions, the Court’s focus 
on stereotype in the equal-protection context has infringed on its 
ability to fully articulate the analysis it has conducted in evaluating 
whether a gender classification is sufficiently tailored to the asserted 
interest. As amici in United States v. Virginia, the National Women’s 
Law Center and the ACLU noted that lower courts have experienced 
“great difficulty” in evaluating whether the means and ends are 
“substantially related.”68 In fact, lower courts have complained that, 
because the Supreme Court’s intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence is 
“indeterminate,”69 and fraught with “problems,”70 it fails to provide 
lower courts with sufficient guidance for evaluating gender-based 
discrimination.71 Members of the Court themselves have even noted 
the potential problems with intermediate scrutiny poses for lower 
courts and litigants attempting to defend or challenge gender-based 
classifications. 72 
                                                                                                                 
66 See Gurian, supra note 9 (describing documented trends of academic underachievement 
among boys and young men). While such trends do not reflect traditional “stereotypes,” it does 
open the door for a new type of “overbroad generalization” that may in the future put males as a 
group at a disadvantage. 
67 See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center American Civil Liberties 
Union, et al., in Support of Petitioner, supra note 4, at *2 (describing intermediate scrutiny as 
“unworkable”). 
68 Id. at *6.  
69 Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 389 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
70 Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 931 (9th Cir. 1991). 
71 See, e.g., Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 398 n.9 (referring to intermediate scrutiny as 
indeterminate); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc., v. City of Phila., 735 F. Supp. 1274, 1303 
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (asserting that intermediate scrutiny provides little guidance to courts in 
decision making), vacated on other grounds, 945 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1991); Joseph v. City of 
Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1335 n.22 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (“[Intermediate scrutiny does] 
not provide definite guidance. . . . [T]he consequent risk [is] that the decisions may appear 
inconsistent and unprincipled.”); see also Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 604 (1st Cir. 
1977) (intermediate scrutiny is “hardly a precise standard”), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978). 
72 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[T]hough the intermediate scrutiny test we have applied may not provide a very clear standard 
in all instances, our case law does reveal a strong presumption that gender classifications are 
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Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence seems to contradict itself with 
regard to the important questions lower courts will have to decide in 
addressing gender-based classifications, especially concerning the 
amount of evidence needed to demonstrate that a classification is 
sufficiently tailored to the asserted interest, whether any amount of 
evidence is sufficient to overcome a charge of “stereotyping,” and the 
required degree of “fit” between a classification and the ends it is 
designed to serve.  
A. The Role of Evidence: How Much Is Enough?  
The Court’s decisions provide little express guidance with respect 
to the amount of evidence a proponent must present to demonstrate 
that a gender-based classification is properly tailored.73 In many 
cases, the Court requires the proponent to present empirical evidence 
to justify its classification. For example, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B, the Court struck down the state’s use of gender-based 
peremptory challenges where the state failed to provide sufficient 
evidentiary support for its argument that gender was an adequate 
predictor of jurors’ attitudes.74 The Court struck down an Oklahoma 
statute in Craig v. Boren for the same reason; although the state 
presented some statistical evidence that males were more likely than 
females to drive while intoxicated, the Court found the evidence 
insufficient to justify a statute allowing females to purchase 3.2% 
beer at a younger age than males.75 
While decisions like Craig and J.E.B. seem to stand for the idea 
that litigants must present meaningful evidence to satisfy the tailoring 
component of intermediate scrutiny, the Court has nevertheless 
upheld gender classifications on several occasions without requiring 
any evidence whatsoever to demonstrate the relationship between the 
classification and the interest.76 In Kahn v. Shevin,77 for instance, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
invalid.” (citation omitted)); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s announcement of intermediate scrutiny as the standard for 
gender classifications). 
73 See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“The Court has upheld gender preferences where no statistics were offered, struck down gender 
preferences despite the presence of statistics, and also decided cases both ways by relying in 
part on statistics.” (internal citations omitted)). 
74  511 U.S. 127, 137–38 (observing that Respondent’s reliance on a single study to 
support a “quasi-empirical claim” is “[f]ar from . . . an exceptionally persuasive justification for 
its gender-based peremptory challenges”). 
75 Craig, 429 U.S. at 199. 
76 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981) (upholding statute requiring only men 
to register for the draft, despite absence of evidence); Craig, 429 U.S. at 203–04 (striking down 
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Court readily accepted that a property tax exemption for women was 
substantially tailored to the government’s interest, despite the absence 
of evidence demonstrating that women were any more likely to need 
such an economic benefit.78 Similarly, in Schlesinger, the Court 
upheld a gender-based classification that allowed women a longer 
period to achieve tenure in the Navy without requiring any 
evidentiary basis for the government’s policy.79 Instead, the Court 
summarily accepted that the classification was based on a 
“demonstrable fact,” and not on archaic or overbroad 
generalizations.80  
B. Does “Stereotype” Trump Sound Evidence? 
In addition to the confusion over if and how much evidence is 
required to sustain a gender classification, the Court’s precedent 
leaves unanswered the question of when, if ever, factually 
demonstrated differences between males and females will suffice to 
rebut a charge of “stereotyping.” Even where the Court finds the 
evidence sufficient to demonstrate a connection between gender and 
the interest to be served, the Court in some cases strikes down the 
classification as grounded in stereotype, while upholding other 
classifications that rely just as heavily on “overbroad generalizations” 
about the roles of men and women. For instance, in Weinberger, the 
Court agreed that the evidence presented was sufficient to 
demonstrate a connection between gender and the need for spousal 
survivor benefits.81 Nevertheless, the Weinberger Court struck down a 
provision of the Social Security Act that allowed only women to 
claim survivors’ benefits, finding that the provision was based on a 
“stereotype”—the assumption that most women do not work outside 
the home.82 By striking down the classification as grounded in 
“stereotype” despite the ample evidence demonstrating the truth of 
the assumption, the Court seemed to refute the proposition that a 
                                                                                                                 
 
statute prohibiting men, but not women between ages 18 and 21 from purchasing 3.2% beer 
despite presentation of statistics); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (striking 
down statute allowing survivors’ benefits for widows but not widowers, despite presentation of 
statistics); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 505–10 (1975) (upholding preferential 
employment treatment for women military officers despite an absence of evidence).  
77  Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).  
78 Id. at 355–56.  
79 Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 505–10. 
80 Id. at 508.  
81 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648. 
82 Id. at 645. 
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demonstrable basis for a gender distinction could be sufficient to 
rebut a charge of stereotyping.83 
The Court reached the opposite result in Califano v. Webster,84 
where the Court addressed the constitutionality of a tax provision that 
allowed women to eliminate more low-earning years from the 
calculation of their retirement benefits than it allowed to men.85 
Despite the policy’s reliance on the assumption that women typically 
earn lower wages than men, the Court found that the policy was not 
based on a stereotype, given the demonstrated economic differences 
between males and females underlying the policy.86 Through this 
analysis, the Court indicated that when a proponent presents sufficient 
evidence of the dissimilarities between males and females, a policy 
will not fail on “stereotype” grounds. Thus, the Court’s analysis 
Webster seems to directly contradict its holding in Weinberger, which 
suggested that even demonstrable differences between males and 
females would not suffice to justify a classification that relied on 
“stereotypes.” 
This contradiction leaves lower courts with little guidance on the 
proper analysis for classifications that have some demonstrable 
support, but also rely on an assumption or stereotypic generalization 
about a gender group.87 Commentators have expressly noted that the 
Court’s gender discrimination jurisprudence “begs the question of 
how exactly to distinguish” policies designed to accommodate 
legitimate differences between males and females, and those based 
on stereotypic beliefs about each gender.88 This also places litigants 
in an even more precarious position, given the lack of certainty over 
which definition of “stereotype” the Court will employ. One possible 
explanation is that the Court simply employed a different definition of 
“stereotype” in Webster and Kahn than it did in Weinberger, enabling 
it to reach opposite results in factually similar cases. This possibility 
seems particularly likely given the variety of ways the Court has 
defined the concept.89 
As Part V below illustrates, however, the different outcomes 
reached in these cases can easily be explained. When read together, 
these cases demonstrate the Court’s application of a more nuanced 
                                                                                                                 
83 Id. at 648. 
84  430 U.S. 313 (1977). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 318–20. 
87 See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993). 
88 Juliet A. Williams, Learning Differences: Sex-Role Stereotyping in Single-Sex Public 
Education, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 555, 566 (2010). 
89 See supra Part II. 
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definition of stereotype than the definition many critics have read into 
the Court’s decisions.90 Thus, the Court’s apparent self-contradiction 
results not from arbitrary reliance on an amorphous and transient 
concept, but rather from the consistent application of principles that 
the Court only expressly articulates in its First Amendment 
intermediate scrutiny analysis. 
C. Proper Level of Scrutiny:  
Will Anything Less than “Exceedingly Persuasive” Suffice? 
Finally, part of the confusion arising out of the Court’s 
preoccupation with the concept of “stereotype” in equal-protection 
intermediate scrutiny cases involves a debate over the proper level of 
scrutiny courts should apply to gender classifications. While the 
Court has not expressly departed from its original articulation of the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, confusion abounds with regard to 
whether the Court’s requirement of an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification”91 in recent cases raised the level of scrutiny applicable 
to gender classifications.92  
At least one commentator contends that the requirement of an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” has transformed the 
intermediate scrutiny standard originally announced in Craig into a 
more demanding level of scrutiny than even strict scrutiny.93 Others 
observe that this standard requires courts to strike down any 
classification that does not function as a “perfect proxy.”94 Under that 
formulation, “exceedingly persuasive” could raise intermediate 
scrutiny to a higher standard than even strict scrutiny.95 Regardless of 
how the standard is articulated, the Court’s decisions “shed[] little 
light on the relationship required between the goal and the means of 
                                                                                                                 
90 See, e.g., Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (”In the constitutional, just as in the statutory, law 
of sex discrimination, ‘stereotype’ has become a term of art by which is simply meant any 
imperfect proxy, any overbroad generalization.”). 
91 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (applying the exceedingly 
persuasive standard); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (same). 
92 Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1170–74 (describing how the exceedingly persuasive standard 
has generated confusion regarding the level of scrutiny that is truly applied to gender 
classifications).  
93 See, e.g., id. at 1173 (contending that the Court’s decisions in Hogan, J.E.B., and 
Virginia “have transformed [intermediate scrutiny] into a more demanding inquiry”). 
94 Case, supra note 5, at 1449–50 (stating that to constitute a “perfect proxy,” a gender-
based classification must apply to “either all women or no women, or all men or no men; there 
must be zero or a hundred on one side of the sex equation of the other”).  
95 Id. at 1453 (“[S]ome rules that might fail the perfect proxy test could nevertheless 
survive strict scrutiny.”). 
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accomplishing the goal under the ‘exceedingly persuasive 
justification’ standard.” 96 
As Part V below illustrates that the Court has only had occasion to 
require a perfect proxy in cases where the classification serves an 
interest unrelated to “inherent differences,” the very reason behind 
allowing states more freedom to utilize gender classifications. This 
leaves open the possibility that a less exacting form of intermediate 
scrutiny may still be appropriate under certain circumstances.  
IV. EQUAL-PROTECTION INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS INFORMED 
BY FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
As the forgoing discussion illustrates, the idea of stereotype 
overwhelms the Court’s intermediate scrutiny equal-protection 
jurisprudence. Because of the challenges that arise when dealing with 
such an ill-defined and ever-changing concept, the Court seems to 
contradict itself with regard to important issues that arise in the 
context of gender-based discrimination, including how much 
evidence a proponent must provide to satisfy the tailoring 
requirement, and whether evidence can ever overcome a charge of 
stereotyping. 
Fortunately, however, equal protection is not the only context in 
which the Court engages in an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Since 
1980, the Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny in the First 
Amendment context when addressing restrictions on commercial 
speech, and has developed a more clearly articulated framework for 
conducting an intermediate scrutiny analysis.97 In Central Hudson, 
the Court announced a four-part “intermediate scrutiny” test for 
restrictions on commercial speech.98 The first prong, which considers 
whether the speech is truthful and non-misleading, is traditionally 
treated as a threshold inquiry; if this prong is satisfied, the 
government must satisfy the remaining three prongs.99 Under the 
second prong, courts must consider whether the government has 
asserted a “substantial interest.”100 The third and fourth prongs 
measure the “fit” between an interest and the means selected to 
                                                                                                                 
96 Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1208.  
97 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
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further it.101 More specifically, the third prong considers whether the 
speech restriction “directly” advances the government’s interest, 
while the fourth prong ensures that the restriction “is not more 
extensive than is necessary” in terms of the speech it restricts. 102 
As the following section will illustrate, the Court’s equal-
protection intermediate scrutiny analyses employ these same 
inquiries, though in a less clearly articulated manner. Reframing the 
Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence in accordance with the 
framework announced in Central Hudson reveals a coherent pattern 
in the Court’s reasoning, and may provide lower courts with much-
needed guidance regarding what the Court has found instructive when 
evaluating the constitutionality of gender-based classifications.  
Because the Court’s First Amendment intermediate scrutiny 
analysis has not been overshadowed by references to stereotype, the 
Court has more clearly developed and explained the intermediate 
scrutiny analysis in that context. For instance, in the First Amendment 
context, the Court applies a tailoring analysis that involves two 
separate prongs.103 The Court conducts a similar division of its 
analysis in the equal-protection context by considering first, whether 
a proponent has shown that males and females are dissimilarly 
situated with respect to an interest, and second, whether the gender-
based policy reaches further than necessary by burdening 
“exceptional” members of the gender group.  
The Court also explains that in the First Amendment context, a 
closer fit between the government’s means and its ends may be 
required when the interest to be served is unrelated to the purpose of 
affording less protection to commercial speech.104 This provides some 
insight into why the Court employs a heightened “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” standard for some gender-based 
classifications, indicating that the traditional intermediate scrutiny 
standard still applies in some circumstances. 
As the following subsections will illustrate, the Court’s equal-
protection intermediate scrutiny analyses employ these same 
inquiries, though in a less clearly articulated manner. Reframing the 
Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence in accordance with the 
framework announced in Central Hudson may provide lower courts 
                                                                                                                 
101 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
102 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
103 Id. 
104 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (plurality opinion of 
Stevens, J.) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, n.9) (noting that prohibitions with 
objectives unrelated to consumer protection “rarely survive constitutional review”). 
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with much-needed guidance regarding what the Court has found 
instructive when evaluating the constitutionality of gender-based 
classifications.  
A. Evidence of Dissimilarity: Equal Protection’s Analogue to the 
Third Central Hudson Prong 
Under the third Central Hudson prong, the Court requires that a 
restriction on commercial speech must “directly advance” the 
government interest asserted.105 In this respect, the Court requires the 
government to show that it has “carefully calculated”106 the costs and 
benefits associated with its infringement on constitutional rights. In 
other words, the government must demonstrate that the restriction 
will actually further its purpose, and that it will do so in a material 
way. This usually requires the government to demonstrate a 
connection between the burdened speech and the harm to be 
remedied,107 and in many cases the proponent must show that the 
speech it restricts contributes more heavily to the problem than forms 
of speech that are not affected by the restriction.108 Where commercial 
speech is no more responsible for the problem than noncommercial 
speech, the Court does not allow the restriction to stand, particularly 
where a burden on noncommercial speech would serve the 
government’s interest just as much as a burden on commercial 
speech.109 
Though often buried in a discussion about stereotypes and 
generalizations, the Court conducts this same analysis when 
determining whether a gender-based classification is sufficiently 
tailored under the Equal Protection Clause, by inquiring whether a 
policy favoring one gender will advance the asserted interest more 
than a gender-neutral policy or a policy favoring the opposite 
gender.110 In conducting this analysis, the Court considers whether 
                                                                                                                 
105 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
106 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993). 
107 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504–05 (describing the required connection 
between the burdened speech and the harm that the regulation was meant to address); Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (same). 
108 See, e.g., Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 418–19 (noting that a speech regulation is not 
reasonable if it affects speech that is less responsible for a governmental problem than other 
forms of unregulated speech). 
109 See id. (discussing the necessary degree of fit between the policy and the government’s 
interest to pass constitutional muster). 
110 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282 (1979) (“Progress toward fulfilling such a 
purpose would not be hampered, and it would cost the State nothing more, if it were to treat men 
and women equally by making alimony burdens independent of sex.”); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (“[T]he gender-based distinction is gratuitous; without it, 
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males and females are dissimilarly situated with respect to the 
government’s asserted interest.111 In particular, the Court analyzes 
whether the burdened gender contributes to the alleged harm in a 
greater degree, or whether the favored gender feels the negative 
impact of that harm to a greater degree.112 
As discussed in Part III, the Court seems to have equivocated over 
what, if any amount of evidence will suffice to demonstrate that 
males and females are dissimilarly situated. Yet the Court’s treatment 
of this question is consistent with the analysis it conducts in the First 
Amendment context. While the Court has never expressly stated what 
evidence the proponent of a commercial speech restriction must 
present to establish the requisite connection under this prong, 
commentators have observed that the Court employs a sort of “sliding 
scale” analysis.113 Under this approach, the amount of evidence 
required varies depending on the obviousness of the connection 
between the burdened speech and the harm to be addressed. Where 
the connection is a matter of “common sense,” the Court frequently 
upholds restrictions without considering the evidence, if any, 
presented by the government in support of its contention.114 But when 
the asserted connection between commercial speech and a particular 
social harm requires some explanation, the Court strikes down 
restrictions where the government has failed to present empirical or 
anecdotal evidence in support of its position.115  
                                                                                                                 
 
the statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly situated 
to the women the statute aids.”). 
111 See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001) (noting that fathers and 
mothers are not similarly situated); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 
464, 471 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting that adolescent boys and girls are dissimilarly 
situated in regard to the risks associated with teenage pregnancy). 
112 See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471–72 (finding males and females to be dissimilarly 
situated with regard to the government’s interest in preventing rape and teenage pregnancy; only 
males can cause the harms associated with rape and unintended pregnancy, while females suffer 
disproportionately from the effects). 
113 Shannon M. Hinegardner, Note, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto Rational 
Basis Standard for Commercial Speech: A Survey and Proposed Revision of the Third Central 
Hudson Prong, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 545 (2009). 
114 See id. (noting that defenders of logical speech restrictions only need to satisfy lower 
standards of proof); see also Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (accepting 
that advertisements for certain brands of cigarettes increase consumers’ consumption of those 
brands without requiring any empirical evidence to demonstrate a connection); Metromedia, Inc. 
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (readily accepting that commercial billboards designed 
to catch drivers’ attention pose a danger to highway safety). 
115 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S 484, 504 (1996) (striking down 
a ban on alcohol price advertisements in the absence of any evidence that price advertisements 
contributed to greater consumption; connection between speech and harm was not a matter of 
common sense).  
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In many of the decisions upholding classifications without any 
consideration of evidence, the proffered dissimilarity is based on what 
the Court perceives to be an obvious distinction between males and 
females. Since its articulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard, 
the Court consistently treats only differences grounded in biology as 
matters of “common sense.”116 Moreover, many of the Court’s 
decisions upholding classifications without any consideration of 
evidence involve a biological dissimilarity related to what is perhaps 
the most obvious biological distinction between males and females: 
the ability to become pregnant and bear children.117  
In contrast, in cases where Court required a more detailed showing 
of the connection between gender and the interest the state seeks to 
advance, the proffered distinctions were unrelated in any way to 
biological or physiological differences.118 Accordingly, many of the 
gender classifications failed based on a lack of evidence were 
grounded in a “dissimilarity” unrelated to physiological 
differences.119 Rather than equivocating with regard to the amount of 
evidence a proponent must provide in defending its gender-based 
classification, the Court has engaged in a consistent pattern of 
                                                                                                                 
116 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63 (noting that fathers and mothers are not similarly 
situated); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471 (noting that adolescent boys and girls are dissimilarly 
situated in regard to the risks associated with teenage pregnancy). The Court has also at least 
one other dissimilarity grounded in law to be a matter of common sense. See Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981) (accepting, without any evidence, that males and females are 
dissimilarly situated with respect to the government’s interest in using a draft to gather combat-
ready troops, because federal law excludes women from combat). In its pre-intermediate 
scrutiny jurisprudence, the Court also accepted social and economic differences between males 
and females as “obvious,” when it upheld the gender-based distinctions in Kahn and Schlesinger 
without any evidentiary showing that males and females were in fact dissimilarly situated with 
respect to the asserted interests in providing for needy spouses or compensating for a lack of 
opportunities for military career advancement. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 
(1975) (“[T]he different treatment of men and women naval officers . . . reflects, not archaic and 
overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and female line officers 
in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service.”); 
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) (“There can be no dispute that the financial 
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or any other State exceed those facing the 
man.”). 
117 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63 (noting that fathers and mothers are not similarly 
situated); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471 (noting that adolescent boys and girls are dissimilarly 
situated in regard to the risks associated with teenage pregnancy)  
118 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1994) (difference 
related to potential for bias against criminal defendant); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
619 (1984) (purported difference related to opinions and preferred topics of discussion); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (difference related to drunk driving). 
119 See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (invalidating use of gender as a basis for preemptory 
challenges to jurors); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612 (upholding state law that forbid private groups 
from discriminating on the basis of gender); Craig, 429 U.S. at 192 (striking down statute 
creating different minimum ages for males and females to buy 3.2 percent alcohol content beer). 
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analysis that takes into account the type of dissimilarity the proponent 
relies on. When a distinction between genders is based on an 
observable fact, the distinction requires no evidentiary support. For 
instance, the Court required no evidence in Michael M. and Nguyen 
because the government relied on observable biological differences 
between males and females.120 Similarly, the Court required no 
evidence in Rostker and Schlesinger, where the alleged dissimilarities 
were based on observable factors: federal laws expressly excluding 
women from combat. Thus, when dissimilarity is grounded in factors 
that courts can independently verify, courts can easily evaluate 
whether a preference for one gender will advance the government’s 
interest more effectively than a neutral policy. Conversely, when a 
dissimilarity is less obvious, proponents of gender-based 
classifications must be prepared to demonstrate an evidentiary basis 
for any claims that males and females are dissimilarly situated. As the 
Court’s decisions indicate, such evidence is essential to a court’s 
ability to determine whether the classification is in fact tailored to the 
government’s interest, or whether the government has simply 
invented a “post hoc” explanation for a constitutionally impermissible 
policy.121 
B. Burden on Exceptional Members: Equal Protection’s Analogue to 
the Fourth Central Hudson Prong 
While the analogy between the third Central Hudson prong and 
the Court’s analysis of whether males and females are “dissimilarly 
situated” may explain the Court’s equivocation over the amount of 
evidence required to sustain a gender-based classification as 
sufficiently tailored, it does not explain why the Court strikes down 
gender classifications it deems to be based on “stereotypes” despite 
its recognition of a strong factual and evidentiary basis for a 
distinction.122 
The answer becomes clear when the Court’s decisions are viewed 
once again through the lens of Central Hudson. Like the Central 
Hudson fit test, which is comprised of the third and fourth prongs,123 
the equal-protection tailoring analysis consists of two components. In 
addition to considering whether the genders are sufficiently 
                                                                                                                 
120 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471. 
121 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (justifications cannot 
be invented post hoc or in response to litigation). 
122 See supra Part III. 
123 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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dissimilar, such that preferring one gender to the other will 
substantially advance the government’s interest in solving or 
preventing a social problem, the Court also incorporates a concern for 
“exceptional” members of a gender group into its tailoring analysis.124 
This concern for members who either do not contribute to or who are 
not affected by the targeted problem in the same way as other 
members of their gender group reflects the analysis the Court 
conducts under the fourth Central Hudson prong, which considers 
whether a restriction burdens more speech than necessary to serve the 
state’s interest.125  
This explains the result in cases like Weinberger and Goldfarb; 
despite the sufficiency of the evidence presented to satisfy the equal-
protection equivalent of the third Central Hudson prong (dissimilarly 
situated with respect to an interest) the statute’s failure to pass 
constitutional muster can be attributed to its overbreadth. In striking 
down the statutes at issue in both Weinberger and Goldfarb, the Court 
criticized the government’s reliance on the “overbroad 
generalizations” that male workers’ earnings are more vital to the 
support of their families than the earnings of similarly situated 
females,126 or that widows are more “needy” than widowers.127 It 
seems at first glance that because these cases hinged on “stereotype,” 
the strength of the evidence presented made no difference to the 
Court. Further review reveals, however, that the Court’s finding of a 
“stereotype” in those cases was based on the same overbreadth 
analysis it employs under the fourth Central Hudson prong. 
Specifically, the Court struck down the classifications because they 
burdened more members of a gender group than necessary to achieve 
the government’s interest. 
Tellingly, in striking down the provision in Weinberger as 
reflective of a “stereotype,” the Court observed that it 
“denigrat[ed] . . . the efforts of women who do work and whose 
earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.”128 Thus, 
the Court acknowledged that while most men and women are 
                                                                                                                 
124 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996) (striking down VMI’s 
male-only admissions policy based on the lower courts’ finding that some women could benefit 
from VMI’s adversative method). 
125 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
126 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977). 
127 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 n.19 (1975) (“[I]f the society’s aim is to 
further a socially desirable purpose . . . it should tailor any subsidy directly to the end desired, 
not indirectly and unequally by helping widows with dependent children and ignoring widowers 
in the same plight.”). 
128 Id. at 645. 
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dissimilarly situated with respect to the government’s interest in 
providing for widow’s benefits, the statute’s fatal flaw was its 
disadvantage to exceptional women. Similarly, in Califano v. 
Goldfarb, the Court struck down a provision of the Social Security 
Act that denied many female wage earners the opportunity to provide 
for their families through social security old age benefits.129 Despite 
the overwhelming evidence that most primary wage earners were in 
fact male, the Court found it persuasive that the provision impacted 
those females who fell outside the gender norm, and were in fact the 
primary wage earners for their families.130 The Court echoed this 
same sentiment in Virginia, when it struck down VMI’s male-only 
admissions policy.131 Despite its observation that VMI’s educational 
technique would not be suitable for most women, the Court could not 
overlook the policy’s impact on exceptional women.132 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Ginsberg noted that if even one woman could 
benefit from VMI’s adversative teaching method, VMI’s gender-
based policy could not pass intermediate scrutiny.133 
These decisions indicate that in conducting a tailoring analysis, the 
Court is not concerned with whether more individuals than necessary 
are merely affected by the classification, but rather whether more 
individuals than necessary are burdened by the classification. This 
helps to explain why the Court sustained the gender preferences in 
cases like Kahn and Webster, despite the undoubtedly overbroad 
impact of the provisions at issue. Indeed, the tax exemption in Kahn 
or the benefits at issue in Webster undoubtedly benefitted more 
women than necessary to serve the government’s interest, as it would 
be difficult to argue that every woman who received the property tax 
deduction in Kahn suffered from the economic disadvantages the state 
sought to address. In this respect, the policies were no different than 
the “overbroad” policies struck down in Goldfarb and Weinberger. In 
all four cases, the policies extended to “exceptional” members of the 
gender group at issue. The difference in outcome, however, lies in the 
direction of the impact. In Goldfarb and Weinberger, the Court found 
that the policies served to disadvantage exceptional women, while the 
policies in Kahn and Webster provided a benefit to all women, 
                                                                                                                 
129 Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 199 (holding that the provision violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment). 
130 Id. at 206. 
131 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546 (1996) (holding that Virginia did not meet 
the necessary exceedingly persuasive justification needed for any gender-based classification). 
132 Id. at 542 (observing that Virginia could not “constitutionally deny to women who have 
the will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords”). 
133 Id. at 546. 
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including those exceptional women who were unaffected by the 
problem the government sought to remedy. Thus, an impact on 
exceptional members of a gender group may not always prove fatal to 
a gender classification, so long as the impact is advantageous, or at 
least neutral. 
When framed in this way, the Court’s definition of “stereotype” is 
far narrower than its common usage might suggest.134 Rather than 
referring to any gender-based assumption that does not apply to all 
members of a group,135 the Court uses the concept of “stereotype” 
only to strike down policies that impose a burden on those members 
of the group to whom the generalization does not apply, and thus are 
not “dissimilarly” situated from members of the opposite gender. 
C. Exceedingly Persuasive and Perfect Proxy:  
Equal Protection’s “Special Care” 
While the application of Central Hudson’s third and fourth prongs 
may clear up the some confusion over the Court’s treatment of 
evidence and the relationship between evidence and stereotypes, the 
remaining question concerns whether the Court’s requirement of an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” in certain equal-protection 
cases creates a higher degree of scrutiny, and whether such a standard 
must apply to all gender-based classifications.136 
The answer to this question lies in the relationship of the second 
Central Hudson prong to the third and fourth prongs. Specifically, 
where the government asserts an interest under the second prong that 
is unrelated to preventing a commercial harm, the Court has observed 
that the reasons for affording a lower level of scrutiny disappear.137 
This is because the purpose of applying a lower level of scrutiny to 
restrictions on commercial speech is to allow for greater protection 
against the harm that commercial speech can potentially cause to 
consumers.138 When the potential for such harm is not present, the 
                                                                                                                 
134 See Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (broadly defining stereotype). 
135 Id. at 1450. 
136 See Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1173 (discussing the various interpretations of the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” standard). 
137 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501–03 (1996) (plurality 
opinion of Stevens, J.) (observing that “there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous 
review that the First Amendment generally demands” where a government restriction on 
commercial speech is unrelated to commercial harm). 
138 The Court has characterized “commercial harm” as the detrimental effects that result 
when speech deprives consumers of a fair bargaining process by either restricting their ability to 
make contractual choices, or by misleading them about the relative costs and benefits of a 
proposed transaction. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (“[C]ommercial harm” involves 
infringement on “a fair bargaining process.”); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 
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Court cautions that commercial-speech restrictions must be reviewed 
with “special care” to ensure a closer fit between the government’s 
interest and the means selected to achieve them.139 This higher degree 
of scrutiny is parallel to the heightened standard the Court created in 
the equal-protection context by requiring an “exceedingly persuasive” 
justification in many of its cases.140 More importantly, however, the 
survival of a less exacting form of intermediate scrutiny in the First 
Amendment context demonstrates that the Court still employs a 
standard less demanding than “exceedingly persuasive” in equal-
protection cases where the interest asserted relates to the purpose of 
intermediate scrutiny. 
In the equal-protection context, the Court reasoned that purpose of 
intermediate scrutiny is to account for “inherent differences” between 
the genders.141 In this respect, equal-protection intermediate scrutiny 
affords government actors more leeway in classifying on the basis of 
gender, just as First Amendment intermediate scrutiny allows more 
leeway in restricting commercial speech. In both contexts, 
intermediate scrutiny accounts for unique circumstances where 
government infringement on constitutional rights may be justified 
based on some countervailing need or interest.  
Thus, where a gender classification is designed to serve an interest 
that is unrelated to addressing inherent differences, it logically 
follows that the Court should employ a more “exacting” review of the 
fit between the interest and the ends designed to serve it. It is not 
surprising, then, that in a majority of the cases where the Court struck 
down a classification that burdened exceptional members, the asserted 
                                                                                                                 
 
(1995) (finding a potential for commercial harm based on conclusion that attorney solicitations 
of accident were likely to unfairly coerce consumers during a vulnerable and highly emotional 
time). 
139 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447, 477 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)). Importantly, the Court has never suggested that a 
heightened standard should apply in the First Amendment context where the asserted interest is 
related to preventing commercial harms. See, e.g., Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 620 (finding an interest 
related to preventing commercial harm to consumers). 
140 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (holding that the reason 
for the gender discrimination must be “exceedingly persuasive”); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that the exceedingly persuasive justification burden 
is met “only by showing at least that the classification serves ‘important governmental 
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.’” (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 
142, 150 (1980))).  
141 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208 (1976) (describing the reason for viewing gender 
classifications with less scrutiny than racial classifications); see also Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 
(“‘Inherent differences’ between men and women . . . remain cause for celebration . . . ”). 
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government interest was in fact unrelated to inherent differences 
between males and females.142 Therefore, when an interest is related 
to inherent differences, it follows that the Court should not require as 
perfect a fit between the means and the ends, and would likely 
tolerate a modest burden on some exceptional members. 
While the Court has not had occasion to expressly decide whether 
a less-perfect proxy would be permissible when a classification is 
related to inherent differences, its First Amendment jurisprudence 
indicates that a burden on some “exceptional members” of the gender 
group would not prove fatal to the classification. Additionally, it is no 
coincidence that the Court has never had an opportunity to 
demonstrate this principle, as the requirement of perfect fit has always 
been met in cases where the government interest addresses an 
“inherent difference.” This is because the only “inherent differences” 
the Court expressly recognized are those related to the reproductive 
functions of males and females, a characteristic for which gender is 
necessarily a perfect proxy.143 Thus, the biologically based policies in 
cases like Nguyen and Michael M did not burden exceptional 
members, because no such members existed.  
Still, this is not to say that a scenario could never arise where a 
classification based on biological factors such as brain chemistry or 
hormones does burden exceptional members. The Court never 
foreclosed the possibility that “inherent differences” may refer to 
differences that, while grounded in biological factors, are unrelated to 
reproduction. For instance, a growing body of research indicates that 
males and females are physiologically different with respect to brain 
functioning, brain chemistry, and hormonal levels, such that the 
different learning styles and methods of reasoning often attributed to 
each gender may in fact be grounded in measured physiological 
differences.144 One potential problem with relying on neurological 
and hormonal differences to justify gender-based classifications is the 
difficulty inherent in line drawing. Unlike reproductive capabilities, 
                                                                                                                 
142 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 518 (asserting interest in providing diverse educational 
opportunities); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 654 (1975) (asserting interest in 
providing for families upon the death of a wage-earner). 
143 See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001) (upholding a law that requires 
legitimization of paternity before a child born outside the United States whose father is a citizen 
may gain citizenship); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 465 
(1981) (upholding California’s statutory rape law, relying in part on the fact that the law aimed 
to protect illegitimate teenage pregnancies); see also Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (defining 
“perfect proxy”). 
144 Williams, supra note 88, at 571. Such differences are often cited in support of single-
sex education programs. Id.  
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which necessarily place individuals into one category or another, 
hormonal and neurological characteristics may not always create such 
a clear division. In this respect, a classification based on non-
reproductive biological differences could have greater potential to 
affect and possibly burden those “exceptional” males and females 
who do not fall on the same side of the line as the majority of their 
gender group. Still, the Court has never foreclosed the possibility, and 
its First Amendment jurisprudence even supports the possibility that 
the Court would sustain a classification despite any burden imposed 
on exceptional members where the interest asserted relates to 
“inherent differences” between males and females.  
In this respect, the role of biology in the intermediate scrutiny 
analysis is two-fold. First, described in Section III of this Comment, 
when an asserted dissimilarity between males and females is 
grounded in biology, the Court does not require that the proponents of 
a gender-based classification present any outside evidence of that 
dissimilarity. Rather, the Court readily accepts that men and women 
are dissimilarly situated in those cases. Second, when the proponent 
asserts an interest that addresses biological differences between males 
and females, the Court may tolerate a policy that burdens exceptional 
members of a gender group. 
Additionally, depending on the outcome of a case currently under 
the Court’s consideration,145 biological differences may soon be the 
only permissible basis for a gender-based classification. Indeed, the 
Court has not upheld a gender-based classification based on non-
biological factors since 1981.146 In United States v. Flores-Villar,147 
the petitioner challenged an immigration statute, which provides that 
citizen fathers who have not lived in the United States for at least five 
years after the age of fourteen are prohibited from transmitting 
citizenship to their illegitimate children born abroad.148 Neither the 
alleged interest in preventing statelessness nor the alleged 
dissimilarity between males and females is grounded in biology; the 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether, as the petitioner 
                                                                                                                 
145 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct 
1878 (2010). 
146 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981) (finding it constitutional to register only 
men for the draft because women are excluded from combat, men and women were dissimilarly 
situated with respect to the government’s interest in providing combat-ready troops during 
wartime). 
147 536 F.3d 990. 
148 Id. 
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alleges, a gender-based classification must be based on biological 
factors.149  
If the Court in Flores-Villar finds in the petitioner’s favor, it will 
signal to lower courts and litigants that differences that are not 
grounded in biological factors, such as the socioeconomic differences 
recognized in the Court’s early intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence,150 
are no longer permissible grounds for distinguishing between males 
and females. But, until the Court indicates that nonbiological 
differences are no longer a permissible basis for distinguishing based 
on gender, nonbiological differences may suffice, so long as the 
proponent can demonstrate through evidence that males and females 
are dissimilarly situated, and that the classification does not impose a 
burden on “exceptional” members of a gender group. 
V. APPLICATION: GENDER-BASED ADMISSIONS  
POLICIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
As the following discussion illustrates, the Central Hudson test for 
intermediate scrutiny may inform the equal-protection equivalent in a 
way that gives courts and litigants addressing gender-based 
admissions policies a more manageable framework for applying 
intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the following sections discuss how courts 
and litigants can effectively address challenges to such policies in a 
manner that is both effective and consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence. 
Based on the concerns that both college admissions administrators 
and outside observers raise regarding the negative effects of a 
predominantly female student body, proponents of gender-based 
admissions policies may assert that the classification serves the 
following “important interests”: (1) preserving the university’s ability 
to attract qualified applicants, and (2) minimizing the opportunity for 
a “hookup” culture to develop on campus.151 When realigned within 
the Central Hudson framework, the Court’s equal-protection 
                                                                                                                 
149 Id. The Court heard oral arguments in November 2010, but has not yet rendered a 
decision. Flores-Villar v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG (May 11, 2011), http://www.scotusblog. 
com/case-files/cases/flores-villar-v-united-states/.  
150 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (holding that a law giving women 
more time than men to gain a promotion before mandatory discharge was constitutional because 
female officers do not have the opportunities for advancement than male officers have); Kahn v. 
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (holding that a tax law granting widows an annual $500 tax 
exemption was constitutional because a woman faces a greater financial burden when she loses 
her husband than when a man loses his wife).  
151 See supra Part I (discussing concerns regarding the effects of the increasingly female 
population on campuses). 
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jurisprudence demonstrates that courts must consider the following 
when evaluating whether gender-based admissions policies are 
substantially tailored to either interest: (1) whether an admissions 
policy favoring males will serve the government’s interest to a greater 
degree than a gender-neutral policy or a policy favoring females; and 
(2) whether the classification burdens “exceptional” females.  
Based on the Supreme Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence as 
reframed under Central Hudson’s framework, courts determining 
whether an admissions policy favoring males will further the 
government’s interest to a greater degree than a gender-neutral or 
female-favoring policy, will consider whether males either 
(1) contribute to the problem in greater proportion, or (2) are affected 
by the problem to a greater degree than females.152 Proponents of 
gender-based policies may contend that males contribute to the 
problems associated with a hookup culture in greater proportion than 
females, and are therefore dissimilarly situated. Proponents may also 
argue that because females contribute to the decline in a university’s 
appeal to applicants to a greater degree than males, females are 
dissimilarly situated from males with respect to that interest. 
In its decisions evaluating dissimilar situation, the Court has only 
upheld classifications that benefit the gender that is more negatively 
affected by a problem.153 Similarly, the Court has only upheld policies 
imposing a burden on the gender that contributes to a problem to a 
greater degree.154 Never has the Court upheld a policy that burdens 
members of the gender group more severely affected by the problem 
the policy seeks to remedy. This likely forecloses universities from 
relying on precedent like Michael M and Nguyen to contend that 
males and females are dissimilarly situated. Because males contribute 
to the problems associated with a hookup culture, a policy favoring 
the gender that allegedly contributes to a problem would be 
anomalous under intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence. Moreover, to 
further burden members of the gender group more severely affected 
by a problem runs counter to the Court’s insistence that “inherent 
                                                                                                                 
152 See supra Part V. 
153 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) 
(upholding a statute which afforded females greater protection from statutory rape, a problem 
that affects females more than males); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. 498 (upholding a policy that 
benefitted for female Navy officers where the problem associated with a lack of advancement 
opportunity for women in the Navy necessarily affected women more than men). 
154 Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (noting that problems involving lack of 
proof of parentage are more attributable to male than female parents); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 
475 (finding that the statute provides an additional deterrent for men who do not have the 
significant deterrents to sexual intercourse as females).  
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differences” cannot be use “for denigration of the members of either 
sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”155 
Accordingly, the best argument for a university seeking to 
establish that males and females are dissimilarly situated with respect 
to both interests may be that female students, by their very presence 
on campus, are in fact the group with contributes to the harm(s) the 
university seeks to avoid. While this contention seems to unfairly 
fault females for a phenomenon that is outside their individual 
control, the Court endorsed a very similar contention in Nguyen. By 
acknowledging that the males contribute more than females to the 
problem of inconclusive proof of parentage, the Court seemed 
unconcerned with the fact that a male’s inability to conclusively 
prove parentage by his presence at birth falls outside his control. 
Still, an argument that females’ presence on a college campus 
somehow changes the nature of the university as an institution runs 
dangerously close to the types of contentions the Court rejected in 
cases like Virginia and Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees.156 In those cases, the 
proponents of male-only policies contended that the admission of 
women would somehow “alter” the nature of the institution; in both 
instances, the Court struck the classification down as insufficiently 
tailored because of their basis in “stereotypes” about “the way women 
are.”157 As the foregoing analysis reveals, the more persuasive factors 
in those cases were the absence of evidence or common 
sense/inherent differences demonstrating the connection between 
femaleness and the overall nature of an institution, and the burden 
imposed on exceptional women where the basis for the policy was not 
grounded in an inherent difference.  
Thus, if proponents of gender-based admissions policies could 
empirically demonstrate that males and females are dissimilarly 
situated in terms of their impact on a campus culture—or, in other 
words, that no male’s presence on campus would contribute to an 
environment where men are “in demand”158—then a court might be 
more willing to accept that a preference for males will in fact further 
an interest in preventing a hookup culture. Similarly, if a proponent 
could successfully demonstrate through evidence that no male’s 
                                                                                                                 
155 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
156 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
157 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542 (rejecting “[t]he notion that admission of women would 
downgrade VMI’s stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school”); 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625 (rejecting Jaycees’ claim that admitting women to meetings would 
change the nature of the discussions held at meetings). 
158 See Case, supra note 5, at 1449–50 (defining “perfect proxy”). 
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presence on campus would reduce the school’s ability to attract the 
most qualified applicants, this may be sufficient to establish that 
males and females are dissimilarly situated with respect to the 
proponent’s interest.159 
As discussed above, evidence of dissimilarity with respect to an 
interest may be insufficient to establish that a gender-based 
classification is sufficiently tailored if a gender-based admissions 
policy burdens “exceptional” females. In the context of the interests a 
university is most likely to assert, such exceptional women would 
include those, if any, whose presence on campus could not 
(1) contribute to the creation of a social culture where men are in 
demand, or (2) inhibit the university’s ability to attract applicants.160 
When the interest is framed as avoiding a social culture where 
males are in demand, the classification arguably imposes a burden on 
“exceptional” women who could not, by virtue of their sexual 
orientation, contribute to a culture where males are in demand.161 
While an attraction to males may serve as a more perfect proxy than 
gender, it would be near impossible (and legally objectionable)162 for 
a university to accurately identify and grant preference to those 
women in the application process. Thus, a burden on exceptional 
members seems unavoidable when the interest centers on preserving 
the social environment. 
Still, courts could accept that an interest in preventing a hookup 
culture addresses “inherent differences” between males and females, 
particularly if a proponent can demonstrate that biological factors, 
such as hormones and brain chemistry, are responsible for driving the 
behavior that occurs when one gender is in demand. In that case, the 
Court’s First Amendment precedent supports, and its equal-protection 
cases do not foreclose, the possibility that a burden on exceptional 
members may not be fatal to a gender-based classification. Still, 
because the Court has yet to recognize an “inherent difference” 
unrelated to reproductive functions, questions remain over whether 
                                                                                                                 
159 In addition to the challenges necessarily associated with demonstrating such a 
contention, it would be difficult to argue that a dissimilarity based on the impact that 
individual’s presence has on the attractiveness of a university to other applicants falls within any 
of the categories of dissimilarities that the Court has previously recognized. 
160 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that the state must demonstrate 
that preference for women would inhibit the state’s ability to achieve its goals). 
161 This does not assume that all women interested in men would in fact participate in a 
hookup culture. It only assumes that such women, by altering the gender ratio on campus, would 
foster an environment more conducive to such a culture by placing males in the minority.  
162 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s Amendment 
Two because it discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation). 
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the different ways in which males and females both contribute to and 
are affected by a hookup culture fall within the Court’s definition of 
“inherent differences.” In one respect, courts could potentially find 
that gender-based admissions policies address the same type of 
inherent differences the Court has previously recognized. 
Alternatively, proponents may push courts to recognize that “inherent 
differences” encompass more than just reproductive differences, such 
that differences grounded in hormones and brain chemistry may 
suffice as evidence that males and females are dissimilarly situated.163 
Because an interest in attracting applicants is less easily framed as 
addressing “inherent” difference between males and females, courts 
evaluating such policies may very well require a “perfect proxy.” A 
plausible argument exists that there would be no “exceptional” 
women, particularly if courts accept that all females, by their very 
admittance, pose a threat to the university’s interest in attracting 
future applicants. In this respect, gender would serve as a perfect 
proxy for impact on a school’s attractiveness to applicants. Thus, 
despite serving an interest unrelated to biological or inherent 
differences, a classification designed to preserve a university’s ability 
to attract applicants could nevertheless satisfy equal-protection 
intermediate scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the major difficulties facing lower courts and litigants in 
challenges to gender-based policies is the muddled state of gender-
discrimination jurisprudence.164 As this Comment demonstrates, the 
Supreme Court’s gender-discrimination jurisprudence may be less 
murky than it seems at a surface level; the Court’s commercial-speech 
decisions provide insight into the Court’s analysis in reaching what 
appear to be contradictory decisions.  
Just as the Court considers whether a commercial-speech 
restriction will directly and materially advance the government’s 
interest, it analyzes whether, based on a dissimilarity between males 
and females, a gender-based classification will further the 
government’s interest to a greater degree than a gender-neutral policy. 
While the Court seems to contradict itself with regard to the amount 
of evidence the proponent of a gender-based classification must 
                                                                                                                 
163 See Williams, supra note 88, at 571 (discussing the emerging statistical evidence that 
hormones and brain physiology account for the differences between male and female learning 
and thinking patterns). 
164 Kingsbury, supra note 1. 
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present, this apparent contradiction can easily explained by the sliding 
scale analysis the Court has employed in the First Amendment 
context; the more “common sense” (i.e., biologically based) a 
dissimilarity, the less evidence the Court requires the proponent to 
present in demonstrating that its classification is substantially tailored. 
Additionally, the Court’s apparent equivocation over the 
relationship between stereotype and evidence can be explained by 
analogy to the fourth Central Hudson prong’s overbreadth analysis. 
Rather than striking down any gender-based classification that 
generally affects more members of a gender group than is necessary 
to serve an interest, the Court only strikes down those classifications 
imposing a burden on exceptional members, just as it does when only 
considering whether a speech restriction burdens more speech than 
necessary under the fourth Central Hudson prong. 
Finally, while the Court’s requirement of an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” in recent equal-protection cases indicates that 
a heightened degree of scrutiny applies to all gender-based 
classifications, its First Amendment cases instruct that the proponent 
need not meet this higher burden when the asserted interest is 
unrelated to the justification for applying intermediate scrutiny in the 
first place. Consequently, a less-exacting version of intermediate 
scrutiny is still applicable to classifications serving an interest related 
to “inherent differences” between males and females. Because neither 
the Court’s equal-protection or First Amendment decisions under 
intermediate scrutiny offer any insight into what the Court views as 
“inherent differences,” the lingering question is whether a less-than-
perfect proxy could ever be acceptable when the policy addresses 
biological differences unrelated to pregnancy and childbearing. Thus, 
while analogizing the Court’s equal-protection decisions to its First 
Amendment intermediate scrutiny framework may go a long way in 
guiding lower courts and litigants, only the Court itself can clarify 
this point. In the event that an equal-protection challenge to gender-
based admissions policy reaches the Court, such a case would provide 
the Court with the perfect opportunity to provide the final bit of 
guidance necessary to place its equal-protection intermediate scrutiny 
jurisprudence back on solid ground. 
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